While the idea that language affects thought and conscious experience (Whorf, 1956) was out of favor Trametinib supplier for a while,

it has reemerged as an important principle in recent times (Lakoff, 1987 and Lucy, 1997). One way that language is important is that it allows the semantic categorization of experience, including emotional experience. For example, there are more than 30 words in English for gradations of fear (fear, panic, anxiety, worry, trepidation, consternation, etc.) (Marks, 1987). The human brain may be able to categorize emotional states in broad strokes without language but it is unlikely that specific emotions (fear, anger, sadness, joy) could come about without words. Accordingly, lacking language and emotion words, an animal brain cannot partition emotional experience in this way. In short, the language of emotion likely contributes to the experiences one has in emotional situations (Schachter, 1975, Johnson-Laird and Oatley, 1989, Scherer, 1984 and Reisenzein, 1995). Indeed, different cultures and their languages express emotions differently (Kitayama and Markus, 1994, Wierzbicka, 1994 and Averill, 1980). The dimensional theory of emotion views emotion words as markers in a multidimensional semantic space of feelings (Russell, 1980 and Russell and Barrett, 1999). The dimensional theory is incompatible with a basic emotions view, since the latter argues that feelings

associated with basic emotions are due to hard-wired circuits, but is compatible Bosutinib with the survival circuit view, which posits indirect and nonobligatory, as opposed to

casual, links between survival circuits and feelings. But the impact of language goes far beyond simple semantics and labeling. We use syntactic processes to evaluate the logical truth of propositional statements. While not all human thought involves propositional statements and logic, syntactic processing provides the human brain and mind with unique features and advantages. Through syntax, the human mind can simulate who will do what to whom in a social situation instantaneously rather than having to learn by trial and Methisazone error. So what then might a bat or a rat experience without the kind of cerebral hardware that is characteristic of the human brain? Some have proposed that in addition to full blown feelings that humans talk about, more basic, less differentiated feelings (crude states of positive or negative valence, or maybe even somewhat finer categories based on memory of feelings from the past in similar situations) may exist in other animals. Such states have been called core affects (Panksepp, 1998 and Panksepp, 2005; Damasio, 1994 and Damasio, 1999; Barrett et al., 2007 and Russell, 2003). While we cannot ask other animals about their feelings, studies of humans can begin to unravel how such states are experienced.